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Abstract
Blame games between governing and opposition parties are a characteristic feature of domestic politics. In the EU, policy-
making authority is shared amongmultiple actors across different levels of governance. How does EU integration affect the
dynamics of domestic blame games? Drawing on the literatures on EU politicisation and blame attribution in multi-level
governance systems, we derive expectations about the direction and frequency of blame attributions in a Europeanized
setting. We argue, first, that differences in the direction and frequency of blame attributions by governing and opposition
parties are shaped by their diverging baseline preferences as blame avoiders and blame generators; secondly, we posit
that differences in blame attributions across Europeanized policies are shaped by variation in political authority struc-
tures, which incentivize certain attributions while constraining others. We hypothesize, inter alia, that blame games are
Europeanized primarily by governing parties and when policy-implementing authority rests with EU-level actors. We test
our theoretical expectations by analysing parliamentary debates on EU asylum system policy and EU border control policy
in Austria and Germany.
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1. The Politics of Blame in the European Union
A central feature of politics is that vote-seeking politi-
cians engage in blame games, attributing blame for
contested policies to one another. The opposition-
government divide has traditionally structured blame
games in domestic politics (Hansson, 2017; Weaver,
2018). EU integration and the concomitant political au-
thority wielded at the EU-level has introduced addi-
tional political actors to the policymaking arena, but
also created ample opportunities for blame attribution
to external EU actors, such as EU institutions or for-
eign EU member state governments (Gerhards, Roose,
& Offerhaus, 2013, pp. 110–112; Hood, 2011, p. 83;
Rittberger, Schwarzenbeck, & Zangl, 2017). As EUpolicies
are increasingly entering the arena of mass politics, they
are becoming more salient and contested in the wider
public (Hooghe & Marks, 2009; Hutter, Grande, & Kriesi,
2016; Kriesi et al., 2006). As a consequence, EU policies
become focal points for the domestic politics of blame.
How, then, does EU integration affect the dynamics of
blame games and hence blame attributions among do-
mestic actors?
Two literatures have, so far, touched upon this
question. First, the literature on blame attribution in
multi-level governance systems suggests that blame
games between government and opposition are, at
least partially, Europeanized as politicians from gov-
erning parties can take advantage of the complex EU
multi-level governance system and shift blame for neg-
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ative outcomes onto external EU actors (Gerhards et al.,
2013; Heinkelmann-Wild & Zangl, 2019; Hobolt & Tilley,
2014; Kumlin, 2011; Roose, Scholl, & Sommer, 2018;
Schlipphak & Treib, 2017; Sommer, 2019; Vasilopoulou,
Halikiopoulou, & Exadaktylos, 2014). Conversely, the
Europeanization of policymaking offers the opposition
more points of attack vis-à-vis governing parties, since
the latter are directly involved in EU policymaking as
members of the Council, but only partially control EU pol-
icy choices and are thus likely to fall short of their pro-
claimed goals (Novak, 2013).
Second, the literature on EU politicisation is, inter
alia, interested in the salience of EU issues and suggests
that the frequency with which national politicians ad-
dress EU policies generally depends on the conflict po-
tential these policies carry for their parties’ constituen-
cies. Opposition politicians, and particularly those from
challenger parties, have a heightened interest in politi-
cizing EU issues in order to drive a wedge through main-
stream government parties. As a consequence, politi-
cized EU policies are likely to be the focus of heightened
blame activities by the opposition. Conversely, politi-
cians from governing parties will seek to avoid and de-
politicize EU issues in order to prevent intra-party di-
visions, voter alienation, and avoid being the target of
frequent blame attributions (de Vries & Hobolt, 2012;
Hobolt & de Vries, 2015; Hutter & Grande, 2014; Hutter
et al., 2016; van de Wardt, 2015; van de Wardt, de Vries,
& Hobolt, 2014).
Both literatures have their merits: The blame attribu-
tion literature develops expectations about the direction
of politicians’ blame attributions, while the politicisation
literature derives expectations about the frequency with
which politicians engage in blame attributions.While the
issue saliency literature has difficulties to explain why
governments do, at times, address contested EU poli-
cies rather frequently (Braun, Hutter, & Kerscher, 2016;
Rauh & deWilde, 2018), the blame attribution literature
has difficulty to account for the observation that govern-
ments sometimes refrain from shifting blame to external
actors (Hobolt & Tilley, 2014), and that opposition par-
ties, at times, blame EU-level actors (Vasilopoulou et al.,
2014, p. 396).
Drawing on and addressing the limitations of existing
explanations, the main ambition of this article is analyti-
cal. To better understand the Europeanization of domes-
tic blame games,we develop expectations about political
parties’ blame attribution behaviour for EU policies, tak-
ing into consideration both the direction as well as the
frequency of blame attributions (Section 2). We argue
that differences in the direction and frequency of blame
attributions can be accounted for by two factors. First,
governing and opposition parties hold different baseline
preferences, the former being blame avoiders and the
latter blame generators. Secondly, blame attributions
are shaped by the policy-specific distribution of policy-
making authority, which incentivizes certain attributions
while constraining others: Whether implementation of a
contested EU policy is conducted by national-level or EU-
level actors affects the direction and frequency of politi-
cians’ blame attribution.We test our theoretical expecta-
tions by conducting a content analysis of blame attribu-
tions by members of parliament (MPs) from governing
and opposition parties in the Austrian Nationalrat and
the German Bundestag for two publicly contested EUmi-
gration policies: the EU’s asylum system policy and EU
border control policy (Section 3). We conclude by sum-
marizing our findings and contributions to the literatures
on blame attribution, politicisation, and EU accountabil-
ity (Section 4).
2. Explaining the Direction and Frequency of Political
Parties’ Blame Attribution Behaviour
Who do national politicians blame for negative EU pol-
icy outcomes and how intensely do they engage in at-
tributing blame?We start from the assumption that vote-
seeking politicians are boundedly rational actorswho are
concerned with the costs and benefits associated with
their actions. This includes the decision on whether or
not to blame another political actor in public for con-
tested policies. Politicians have to decide whether to
“speak up” or keep a low profile (frequency of blame),
and whether to blame domestic or external actors and
thus Europeanize the domestic blame game (direction
of blame). We first theorize how being member of a
governing or opposition party shapes blame strategies—
blame avoidance or blame generation—and thereby
differences in blame frequency and direction. Second,
we explore how the policy-specific authority structure
shapes blame frequency and direction across EU policies.
2.1. Government and Opposition: Blame Avoiders and
Blame Generators
The institutional position of a political party in the politi-
cal system—whether it is in government or opposition—
is a central determinant for its “blame preferences.”
Drawing on Weaver’s (2018) differentiation between
blame avoidance and blame generating strategies, we
conceptualize the distinct blame motivations of govern-
ment and opposition parties. While government parties
tend to be blame avoiders, opposition parties tend to
be blame generators. This difference has distinct impli-
cations for both the frequency and direction of political
parties’ blame attributions.
2.1.1. Governing Parties as Blame Avoiders
Since governing parties exercise policymaking authority,
they are prime targets for blame attributions. The mo-
tivation of governing parties is therefore to avoid or at
least minimize blame for contested policies. Governing
parties thus typically engage in a strategy of blame avoid-
ance and thus of ‘minimizing their responsibility for un-
popular actions taken’ (Weaver, 2018, p. 260; see also,
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Hood, 2011; Weaver, 1986). Once policies are adopted,
the most important tool of blame avoidance are pre-
sentational strategies, ‘attempts to deflect, avoid or
mitigate blame through public rhetoric, argument or
news management’ (Hood, Jennings, & Copeland, 2016,
p. 543). Most prominently, policymakers seek to down-
play their own responsibility for contested policies while
emphasizing the responsibility of other actors through
blame-shifting, i.e., ‘deflect[ing] blame by blaming oth-
ers’ (Weaver, 1986, p. 385; see also, Gerhards et al.,
2013; Hood, 2011, pp. 50–53; Sommer, 2019). As regards
the direction of blame attributions, the direct involve-
ment of governing parties in EU policymaking means
that they have strong incentives for avoiding blame
for contested EU policies by downplaying their own re-
sponsibility and emphasizing the responsibility of oth-
ers. The EU’s multilevel system provides them with am-
ple blame-shifting opportunities as they share policy-
making responsibility with EU institutions (the European
Commission, the European Parliament, the European
Council, the European Court of Justice, the European
Central Bank, or EU agencies) and foreign EU member
state governments (Gerhards et al., 2013, p. 114; Roose
et al., 2018, pp. 49–51; Sommer, 2019). Governing par-
ties will thus direct blame for contested EU policies to
external EU actors.
Regarding the frequency of blame attributions, gov-
erning parties face a trade-off between actively engag-
ing in the blame game or maintaining a low profile.
Engagement in public blame attributions comes with
risks and might even have ‘reverse effects’ (Hood, 2011,
p. 65). For instance, frequent blame attributions can
come with a ‘retribution risk’ (Weaver, 2018, p. 270)
as they might attract the opposition’s attention and
thereby escalate into a ‘blame showdown’ (Boin, Hart,
& McConnell, 2009, p. 89). Similarly, the politicization
scholarship on issue saliency points out that emphasizing
EU issues is a risky strategy for politicians from govern-
ing parties in general (van de Wardt, 2015). As decisions
in the EU are characterised by compromise, EU policy-
making outcomes stray from the governing parties’ ideal
points (Rauh & de Wilde, 2018, p. 199). What is more,
when domestic constituents are Eurosceptic or divided
on EU issues, governing parties are expected to down-
play the agreed upon policy outcomes to avoid electoral
costs (Heinkelmann-Wild, Kriegmair, Rittberger, & Zangl,
2019; van de Wardt et al., 2014, p. 988). The benefits of
blame-shifting might thus be outweighed by its (poten-
tial) costs and prompt governing parties to maintain a
low profile (Hood, 2011, pp. 58–62; Hood, Jennings, &
Dixon, 2009, p. 715). This strategy of non-engagement
‘deal[s] with blame by saying as little as possible’ and
‘sit[ting] out a blame firestorm until it passes over and
public attention comes to be focused on something else’
(Hood, 2011, p. 59). Hence, governing parties tend to
be blame avoiders since the putative costs of frequent
blame attributions normally outweigh the benefits. They
prefer, all else equal, to keep a low profile and engage
in blame attribution rather infrequently and only when
responding to blame attributions from other political ac-
tors. When they do engage in blame attributions, they
prefer blaming external EU actors, such as EU institu-
tions, and foreign EU member state governments over
national authorities.
2.1.2. Opposition Parties as Blame Generators
Since opposition parties seek to challenge the govern-
ment of the day, one primemotivation of opposition par-
ties is to stick blame to the government. They therefore
typically engage in a strategy of blame generation, ‘gen-
erat[ing] negative messages against other politicians’ in
order to inflict political costs on the target, for instance,
by inducing ‘defections amongmembers of the audience
who would otherwise support the target’ (Weaver, 2018,
pp. 267–268). By generating blame, opposition parties
also signal to their constituents that they fulfil their
main task of holding public officials accountable and
that they possess superior problem-solving competence.
Regarding the direction of blame attribution, opposition
parties are likely ‘seeking to frame policy failures as the
responsibility of current officeholder…targets’ (Weaver,
2018, p. 283). They prefer to attribute blame to “their”
national government as well as subordinated public ac-
tors (Hansson, 2017, p. 1; Roose et al., 2018, p. 51).
Regarding the frequency of blame attributions, oppo-
sition parties generally benefit from “speaking up” since
they havemuch towin and little to lose.While opposition
parties might also face costs from frequent blame attri-
butions, such as a backlash from their own supporters,
they should be less risk-averse than governments (van
deWardt, 2015, p. 94). In addition, by engaging in blame
attributions for negative EU policy outcomes, opposition
parties may benefit from merely emphasizing an issue.
Even if not targeting the government directly, increasing
the salience of an issue can drive a wedge through gov-
ernment parties’ constituencies when it is divided on EU
integration in general or on the issue at hand in particu-
lar (van deWardt et al., 2014, p. 988). Hence, opposition
parties are likely to attribute blamemore frequently than
governing parties, and they prefer blaming their national
government over external EU actors.
In sum, all else equal, governing parties are more
likely than the opposition to direct blame to external
EU actors. Moreover, opposition parties are generally
more inclined to engage in blame attribution behavior
than their counterparts in government. While govern-
ment parties tend to be blame avoiders and opposition
parties blame generators, we argue, in the next section,
that these blame attribution motivations are affected by
the policy-specific political authority structure in the EU’s
multi-level system:
H1: The share of blame attributions directed at exter-
nal EU actors is higher for governing parties than for
opposition parties;
Politics and Governance, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 1, Pages 85–94 87
H2: Governing parties engage in blame attribution be-
haviour less frequently than opposition parties.
2.2. Political Authority Structure: Blame Plausibility and
Blame Pressure
In this section we argue that the policy-specific author-
ity structure, in particular the level of government where
policies are implemented, affects political parties’ ability
to pursue their preferred blame strategy in two ways.
2.2.1. Distribution of Political Authority Limits Plausible
Blame Targets
First, political authority structures lend plausibility to spe-
cific blame targets and thus shape the direction of blame
attributions. The institutional structure governing a par-
ticular issue area incentivizes or constrains blame attribu-
tions to certain actors and not to others, even if this con-
tradicts political parties’ baseline preferences for blame
attribution. Claims about the responsibility for contested
policies need to remain plausible: Parties can attribute
blame according to their baseline preferences only in
so far as their blame attributions are able to maintain
the ‘illusion of objectivity’ (Kunda, 1990, pp. 482–483).
Specifically, the direction of blame attributions is cir-
cumscribed by the institutionalised responsibilities in the
policymaking process (Heinkelmann-Wild & Zangl, 2019;
Schwarzenbeck, 2015, p. 37).
EU policymaking generally increases the number of
potential blame targets and its overall complexity obfus-
cates the clarity of individual policymakers’ responsibility
(Hobolt & Tilley, 2014, p. 45; León, Jurado, & Garmendia
Madariaga, 2018, p. 661). Recent literature suggests that
the complexity of EU policymaking puts one set of actors
in the spotlight: implementing authorities (Heinkelmann-
Wild, Rittberger, & Zangl, 2018; Rittberger et al., 2017).
When a political actor is clearly responsible for “on the
ground” implementation, she is likely to be identified
with a policy outcome and becomes focal in the public
domain. The EU’s political authority structure thus incen-
tivizes blame attributions to be directed at implementing
actors, since blame attributions to non-implementing ac-
tors tend to be less plausible (Heinkelmann-Wild & Zangl,
2019). If policy-implementation authority is squarely lo-
cated at the EU-level, governing and opposition parties
have a heightened incentive to attribute blame for nega-
tive policy outcomes to a specific group of external EU
actors: implementing EU institutions. Conversely, if EU
policies are implemented by national-level authorities,
governing parties can shift blame onto other EU mem-
ber states and their respective domestic implementing
authorities, while opposition parties can stick blame to
“their” national government in line with their baseline
blame attribution preferences. While opposition parties
are thus likely to Europeanize blame solely in the case of
EU-level implementation, the governing party can plau-
sibly shift blame to external EU actors. Hence, all else
equal, if a policy is implemented by EU-level actors the
overall share of blame attributions directed at external
EU actors by governing and opposition parties is higher
than when EU policies are implemented by national-
level actors.
2.2.2. Distribution of Political Authority Impacts Blame
Incentives
Second, the policy-specific political authority structure
not only affects the direction, but also the frequency
of blame attributions. When the responsibility for im-
plementing an EU policy rests with national-level au-
thorities, opposition parties can plausibly blame their
preferred target: “their” national government. The fre-
quency of opposition parties’ blame attributions should
thus be higher compared to situations characterized by
EU-level implementation.
National-level implementation therefore puts blame
pressure on governments.When blame is predominantly
targeted at a particular actor, she cannot remain in-
active but seeks to deflect blame by blaming others:
‘Higher levels of blame will be likely to lead to active
attempts to reduce or remove it than “do nothing” or
“no comment” responses’ (Hood et al., 2016, p. 544).
When under blame pressure, governing parties thus
have an incentive to mount their blame attribution ac-
tivities to avoid electoral costs (Traber, Schoonvelde, &
Schumacher, 2019, pp. 3–4). When the responsibility for
implementing an EU policy rests with national-level ac-
tors, the blame pressure on the government is thus likely
to prompt governing parties to enter the blame game
more forcefully—either in anticipation of their focality
as implementing actors, or in evasion of responsibility
once they become focal in the opposition’s blame attribu-
tions. Conversely, if an EU-level actor carries responsibil-
ity for policy-implementation, blame pressure on govern-
ing parties will be more moderate and they will be less
inclined to engage in blame-shifting, hiding out behind
the complexities of EU policymaking. Hence, if a policy
is implemented by national-level actors, the overall fre-
quency of blame attributions by all parties is higher than
when EU policies are implemented by EU-level actors.
In sum, all else equal, we expect that EU-level imple-
mentation increases the overall share of blame attribu-
tions to external EU actors. At the same time, we expect
the overall frequency of blame attributions to be lower
when a contested policy is implemented by EU-level ac-
tors compared to national-level actors:
H3: If EU-level actors implement an EU policy, the
share of blame directed at external EU actors is higher
than if it is implemented by national-level actors.
H4: If EU-level actors implement an EU policy, the fre-
quency of blame is lower than if it is implemented by
national-level actors.
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Table 1 summarizes all expectations about the direction
and frequency of blame attributions in the EU’s multi-
level system.
3. Blame Attributions in EU Multi-Level Politics
To test our theoretical arguments empirically, we anal-
yse the blame attributions of German and Austrian op-
position and governing parties in two cases of contested
EUmigration policy.We first introduce our case selection
and describe the procedure of data collection and coding.
We then present our empirical findings on the direction
and frequency of blame attributions.
3.1. Research Design
We evaluate our hypotheses by comparing political par-
ties’ blame attributions in the Austrian Nationalrat and
the German Bundestag in two instances of EU migra-
tion policies. The focus on parliamentary debates per-
mits an analysis of the direction and frequency of
blame attributions by government and opposition par-
ties. Parliamentary debates are a likely venue for blame
attributions since they pit governmental and opposition
parties against each other. They are also relevant for
the broader public due to their communicative func-
tion with regard to EU policies (Auel, 2007; Rauh & de
Wilde, 2018).
We selected two EU policies that are prominent and
highly contested in the public to ensure sufficient cov-
erage in the parliamentary debates (Hood, 2011, p. 8;
Weaver, 2018, pp. 282–283). First, the EU asylum system
policy regulates which EU member state is responsible
for administering asylum claims by people entering the
EU and defines minimum standards for reception condi-
tions and procedures. It was heavily criticised for a long
row of dysfunctions (Rittberger et al., 2017). Second, EU
border control policy has been designed to save lives at
sea, to strengthen the EU’s external borders and to dis-
rupt the business of traffickers and human smugglers. It
was criticised, inter alia, to have resulted in the deaths
of thousands of migrants crossing the Mediterranean on
their way to the EU (Rittberger et al., 2017).We collected
parliamentary debates from the German Bundestag and
the Austrian Nationalrat starting with the official deci-
sion to adopt the respective policy. Since neither of the
two policies under analysis has been discontinued or re-
placed, the data collection ends with the initiation of the
coding process on 13 August 2018.
The structure of policy-implementation varies across
the two cases: The EU asylum system is implemented
by EU member states, while EU border control poli-
cies are primarily implemented by an EU actor (i.e.,
Frontex). Moreover, the cases display similarities which
allow for the control of possible confounding factors
across policies and countries. First, the two policies be-
long to the same issue area, i.e., the EU’s migration
regime. Second, their policymaking structures are simi-
larly complex: Following a proposal by the Commission,
the Council decides on the respective policy and the EP is
involved either through co-decision or consultation pro-
cedures. Third, Austria andGermany are both considered
destination states of migration movements and were
thus similarly affected by the two policies (Biermann,
Guérin, Jagdhuber, Rittberger, & Weiss, 2019).
To gauge the blame attributions of governing and op-
position parties, we coded the blame attributions voiced
by individual MPs in parliamentary debates, which we
subsequently aggregated to the level of governing and
opposition party. To analyse MPs’ blame attributions,
we combined automated data collection with a qualita-
tive content analysis. Previous studies have mostly en-
gaged in qualitative content analysis to identify politi-
cians’ blame attribution (e.g., Gerhards et al., 2013;
Hobolt & Tilley, 2014, pp. 100–119; Mortensen, 2012,
2013). A common pitfall of these studies constituted
the reliable identification of rare responsibility state-
ments in large text corpora (e.g., Gerhards, Offerhaus,
& Roose, 2007, pp. 117–118; Schwarzenbeck, 2015,
pp. 78–82). Inter-coder reliability tests often show low
levels of agreement with regard to the identified state-
ments. Contrariwise, once a blame statement is identi-
fied, agreement between coders is usually high regard-
ing the components of a specific blame attribution such
as its sender or target.
Our approach combines automated and manual cod-
ing procedures and thereby helps to overcome the two-
fold challenge of identifying relatively rare statements
in large text corpora and, at the same time, account-
ing for their context-sensitivity. Using a blame-related
dictionary, we first automatically coded potential blame
attributions within text segments that referred to the
Table 1. Expectations about the direction and frequency of blame attributions.
Institutional position of blame sender Policy-specific authority structure
(government vs. opposition) (national-level vs. EU-level implementation)
Direction of blame
(share of blame to external Gov senders > Opp senders (H1) National-level < EU-level (H2)
EU actors)
Frequency of blame Gov senders < Opp senders (H3) National-level > EU-level (H4)(absolute blame attributions)
Politics and Governance, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 1, Pages 85–94 89
two policies. Based on the pre-selected sample, we
then manually coded blame attributions that comprised
three criteria:
• Blame object, i.e., a contested policy for which
blame is attributed. For the purposes of this arti-
cle, the policies under consideration were the EU
border control policy and the EU asylum system
policy;
• Blame sender, i.e., an actor that attributes blame
for a policy failure. For the purposes of this article,
we focus on MPs. Blame senders are assigned to
one of the two categories: (i) MPs from a govern-
ing party; or (ii) MPs from an opposition party;
• Blame target, i.e., the actors to whom blame is at-
tributed. For the purposes of this article, blame
targets are assigned to one of two categories:
(i) external EU actors, such as EU institutions (i.e.,
the Commission, the Council and EU agencies like
Frontex) and foreign EU member state govern-
ments and their representatives; or (ii) domestic
public actors (i.e., representatives of the national
government or national MPs).
Overall, we identified 558 blame attributions in
390 debates (for an overview, see Table A.1 in the
Supplementary Material).
3.2. Assessing the Direction of Blame Attributions
With regard to the direction of blame attributions, we
expected that the share of blame attributions from gov-
erning parties targeting external EU actors is higher than
for opposition parties (H1); and that the overall share
of blame attributions directed at external EU actors is
higher in the case policies implemented by EU-level ac-
tors than for policies implemented by national-level ac-
tors (H3). To evaluate these expectations, we display the
share of blame attributions that target domestic actors
and external EU actors respectively for MPs from govern-
ing and opposition parties in the two cases. The overall
pattern of MPs’ blame attribution lends supports to our
expectations (see Figure 1).
First, the share of blame targeted at external EU ac-
tors is higher for governing parties than for opposition
parties in both cases. In the EU asylum system case (see
Figure 1a), the predominant share of governing parties’
blame attributions (60%) targeted external EU actors,
while a minority of their attributions assigned blame to
domestic actors (40%). Conversely, only a minor share of
opposition party MPs’ blame attributions targeted exter-
nal EU actors (33%). They predominantly directed their
blame to domestic actors (67%). In the EU border control
case (see Figure 1b), the predominant share of blame at-
tributions by governing parties was again directed at ex-
ternal EU actors (86%)while only one statement targeted
a domestic actor. While opposition parties also predom-
inantly assigned blame to external EU actors (70%), their
share of blame to external actors is lower than that of
governing parties. A minor share of their blame attribu-
tions targeted domestic actors (30%).
Second, irrespective of a parties’ institutional posi-
tion in the political system, the overall share of blame
attributions directed at external EU actors is higher in the
EU border control case, where policy-implementation is
carried out by an EU-level actor, compared to the EU asy-
lum system case, where policy-implementation is in the
hands of national-level actors. The share of blame attri-
butions targeting external EU actors from governing par-
ties (86%) and opposition parties (70%) is higher in the
EU border control case than the respective shares from
governing parties (60%) and the opposition (33%) in the
asylum system case.
a) EU Asylum System Policy
40%
(36)
100%
75%
50%
25%
0%
Governing Opposion
60%
(55)
67%
(190)
33%
(95)
External EU actors Domesc actors
b) EU Border Control Policy
14%
(1)
100%
75%
50%
25%
0%
Governing Opposion
86%
(6)
30%
(53)
70%
(122)
External EU actors Domesc actors
Figure 1. Direction of blame attributions: a) EU asylum system policy, b) EU border control policy.
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3.3. Assessing the Frequency of Blame Attributions
With regard to the frequency of blame attributions, we
expect that, overall, blame attributions from governing
parties are less frequent than those from opposition
parties (H2). We also expect that blame attributions
are overall less frequent when an EU policy is imple-
mented by EU-level actors than when it is implemented
by national-level actors (H4). To evaluate these expecta-
tions, we display the average number blame attributions
from governing and opposition parties per 100 debates.
The overall pattern of blame attributions again lends sup-
ports to our expectations (see Figure 2).
First, governing parties attribute blame less fre-
quently than opposition parties in both cases. In the EU
asylum system case, opposition parties attributed blame
129 times per 100 debates while the governing parties
only attributed blame 41 times per 100 debates (see
Figure 2a). Similarly, in the EU border control case, op-
position parties attributed blame 104 times per 100 de-
bates while governing parties only attributed blame four
times per 100 debates (see Figure 2b).
Second, blame attributions are less frequent in the
EU border control case, where policy-implementation
rests with an EU-level actor, than in the EU asylum sys-
tem case, where policy-implementation is carried out by
national-level actors. The overall frequency of blame is
higher in the EU asylum system case than the EU border
control case for both the opposition (129 > 104) and the
government (41 > 4). Moreover, we find that the differ-
ence in blame frequency between the two cases is larger
for the government (700%) than for the opposition (24%).
This finding tentatively suggests that increased blame
pressure on the government has a stronger influence on
the frequency of blame attributions than the heightened
incentive for opposition parties to plausibly blame their
preferred target. However, further data is necessary to
substantiate this conclusion.
3.4. Discussion
The observed blame attribution patterns for the con-
tested EU policies corroborate our expectations about
the direction and frequency of national parties’ blame
behaviour. Blame to external EU actors is most promi-
nent in the attributions by governing parties, and when
policies are implemented by EU-level actors. Yet, the
frequency of blame attributions in these instances
is comparatively low. Overall, opposition parties at-
tribute blame more frequently than governing parties.
Moreover, the frequency of blame is higher in cases of
national-level implementation than in cases of EU-level
implementation.
The statistical tests included in the Supplementary
Material substantiate our argument that there is a sig-
nificant relationship between our two independent vari-
ables (institutional position of the blame sender and
policy-specific implementing authority) and the direc-
tion and the frequency of blame attributions. Specifically,
we calculated chi-square tests for the direction of
blame (see Supplementary Material, Tables A.4–7) and
Wilcoxon rank-sum tests for the frequency of blame (see
Supplementary Material, Table A.12). In addition, the
findings still holdwhenwe analyse the blame attributions
in the Austrian Nationalrat and in the German Bundestag
separately. Despite minor differences, the blame attribu-
tion patterns are not only similar and in line with our
expectations, but we can also reject the null hypothe-
sis about a random match on this level of analysis both
for the direction of blame (see Supplementary Material,
Tables A.8–11) and the frequency of blame (see Supple-
mentaryMaterial, Table A.13).Weare thus confident that
the results are not driven by our selection of countries. In
sum, these results bolster our confidence that the posi-
tion of a party in the political system, as well as the policy-
specific authority structure shape the direction and fre-
quency of national parties’ blame attributions.
a) EU Asylum System Policy
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Figure 2. Frequency of blame attributions per 100 debates: a) EU asylum system policy, b) EU border control policy.
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4. Conclusion
In this article we argued that variation in the frequency
and direction of blame attribution for contested EU poli-
cies can be explained by a political party’s government
or opposition status and by the policy-specific author-
ity structure. Our article contributes to a better under-
standing of policy-specific political conflict and elite com-
munication in the EU’s multi-level system. In particular,
the findings allow us to inform claims from three differ-
ent literatures.
First, the EU politicisation literature holds that gov-
erning parties tend to restrain themselves from “speak-
ing up” on EU issues in order to avoid putative electoral
costs that come from their politicization. Yet, we find
that frequent blame attributions are by nomeans limited
to opposition parties. Government parties frequently at-
tribute blame (to external EU actors), especially when
the government holds policy-implementation authority
and when the blame pressure on the governing parties
is thus high.
Second, the literature on blame attribution in multi-
level governance systems posits that policymakers are
rather unconstrained in attributing blame to EU-level ac-
tors. Yet, we find that governing parties only engage in
frequent blame-shifting when policies are implemented
by national-level actors and they are consequently ex-
posed to high blame pressure. Otherwise, they prefer to
hide out in the complexities of EU multi-level policymak-
ing. Moreover, opposition parties even refrain from di-
recting blame to “their” government when EU-level ac-
tors are policy implementers.
Finally, the EU accountability literature diagnoses a
national “opposition deficit” (Rauh & de Wilde, 2018,
p. 210) with regard to EU policies (Auel, 2007; Kiiver,
2006; O’Brennan & Raunio, 2007; Raunio, 2011). Indeed,
we find that governing parties can successfully “duck and
cover,” avoid the opposition’s blame and thus evade ac-
countability when policy-implementation authority rests
with EU-level actors. By contrast, when domestic exec-
utive agencies hold policy-implementing authority, gov-
erning parties are unable to avoid the opposition’s blame,
but—rather than owning their mistakes—they shift the
blame directed at them to external EU actors. In this
sense, blame attribution patterns re-produce the EU’s
much-lamented democratic accountability deficit.
Our findings come with two caveats. First, since our
focus is on two cases of highly contested and salient EU
policies, we cannot conclude that less contested policies
comewith similar blame attributions patterns. Future re-
search should thus look at cases that vary in salience and
across issue-areas. A second and related caveat pertains
to the affectedness of the public by a particular policy is-
sue. As destination states with high migratory pressure,
both Austria and Germany were directly affected by the
EU’s asylum policy (Biermann et al., 2019), whereas the
effects of the EU border control policy were more dis-
tant. The selected cases are thus not suitable to rule out
a link between the degree of affectedness of the analy-
sed countries and the frequency of blame attributions.
Future research should look into cases that vary in their
degree of affectedness while controlling for the politi-
cal authority structure. The insights presented above are,
therefore, only a starting point for the analysis of blame
attribution behaviour in the EU multi-level system.
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